The Death Penalty and Juvenile Offenders
by Jennifer Lubinsky The Supreme Court of
the United States has interpreted the Eight Amendment to the Constitution
broadly - to prohibit both punishments which are per se cruel and unusual, as
well as those punishments which are out of proportion to the severity of the
crime and which serve no valid purpose. Whether a punishment is excessive
is judged according to "evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society."
In June 2002 the Court in
Atkins v. Virginia found that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the death penalty
for mentally retarded offenders. The majority concluded that numerous
state legislatures across the country had enacted statutes prohibiting the
execution of the mentally retarded, providing "powerful evidence that today
our society views mentally retarded offenders as categorically less culpable
than the average criminal." Because of their disabilities in areas of
reasoning, judgment, and control of their impulses, mentally retarded persons do
not act with the level of moral culpability that characterizes the most serious
adult conduct, and the imposition of the death penalty should be confined to a
narrow category of the most serious crimes.
But on October 21, 2002
the Court declined the opportunity to revisit the question whether the
imposition of the death penalty for juvenile offenders violates the Eighth
Amendment. This despite the fact that today, a majority of the states that
permit capital punishment do not authorize it for crimes committed at age 16 or
under. There is a broad social and professional consensus against the
execution of juvenile offenders, and the execution of juvenile offenders has
been rejected by virtually all other nations of the world, both civilized and
uncivilized. Recent scientific advancements show that there is a
physiological difference between the adult brain and the adolescent brain, and
that the brain does not fully develop adult capacity until the early
twenties. Juveniles, like the mentally retarded, simply do not act with
the level of culpability of an adult. Retribution is dependent on moral
blameworthiness, and the conduct of the juvenile murderer simply does not merit
the retribution of the most extreme sanction that any society can impose on its
offenders.
Statues which effectively
serve to prevent juveniles from exercising their constitutional rights, such as
the right to vote and the right to marry without parental consent, serve as a
complete bar to the exercise of those rights and do not take cognizance of the
maturity of the particular individual. It is an anomaly to withhold rights
from juveniles without any analysis of their individual maturity, but to require
an individualized lack of maturity before withholding the exercise of a penalty
which should be reserved only for the most culpable offenders.
The Supreme Court has not
addressed the constitutionality of the death penalty for juvenile offenders
since 1989. There are clear parallels in the analysis of the
constitutionality of the execution of both juveniles and the mentally retarded,
and there is no basis to distinguish the two. Standards of decency have
changed considerably in the past thirteen years, and it is time for the Court to
reconsider the subject in light of those standards.
The views and opinions contained herein do not necessarily
reflect those of the faculty and student
body of the College of Law, the SBA Board or the editorial staff of The Docket.
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