CASES AND MATERIALS FOR
PERSONAL PROPERTY LEASES
PROFESSOR MARK BUDNITZ
Law 7418
SUPPLEMENT NUMBER ONE
SPRING 1999
TABLE OF CONTENTS
True Leases and Disguised Security Interests 1
Taylor v. Subway Equipment Leasing Corp. 3
In Re Murray 10
Jarrells v. Mr. C's Rent to Own 16
In Re Paz 22
NationsBank of North Carolina, N.A., v. Capital Associates International. Inc. 28
NEC Technologies v. Nelson 33
BMW Financial Services, N.A., Inc. v. Smoke Rise Corporation 39
Walnut Equipment Leasing Co. v. Moreno 41
Siemens Credit Corp. v. Newlands 48
Vacation Village, Inc. v. Hitachi America, Ltd. 56
Mercedes-Benz Credit Corp. v. Lotito 58
Ghionis v. Deer Valley Resort Co., Ltd. 65
Colonial Pacific Leasing Corp. v. McNatt 71
Colorado Interstate Corporation v. The CIT Group/Equipment Financing, Inc. 77
AT&T Credit Corporation v. Transglobal Telecom Alliance, Inc. 87
Friedland Family Enterprises v. Amoroso 92
Hollerbach & Andrews Equipment Company, Inc. v. Southern Concrete
Pumping, Inc. 97
TRUE LEASES AND DISGUISED SECURITY INTERESTS
NOTE: "Lease"is defined in Uniform Commercial Code §2A-103(j). However, in order to determine whether a transaction will be treated as a lease, we turn most often, not to this definition, but rather to the definition of "security interest" in §1-201(37).
1) Laura Lawyer obtains a set of twenty computers and software for her law firm from Acme Office Supply. The agreement between the parties is entered into on July 12, 1996 and it provides that the law firm will pay $3,333.33 per month for 30 months for a total of $100,000. A dispute arises concerning the performance of the computers and payment of the monthly amounts and the parties go to court. Although the agreement identifies Laura as the "lessee" and Acme as the "lessor," Laura contends that the parties intended the transaction to be treated as a sale with Acme retaining a security interest. (In other words, Laura contends the agreement is a "disguised" security interest," or a "lease intended for security." ) She produces a tape recording of the parties' negotiating session which clearly indicates both parties intended a sale with a security interest. Assuming there is no bar to the admission of the tape, such as the parol evidence rule (2A-202), of what relevance is evidence of the parties' intent?
2) Is there a true lease if the agreement provides that Laura has the right to terminate at any time, and for any reason, and that upon termination Laura will not owe anything for the remainder of the term of the lease?
3) Assume the agreement provides that Laura has no right to terminate the lease. Can the court conclude from that fact alone that the transaction is a disguised security interest?
4) Assume the agreement provides that Laura has no right to terminate and as of July 12, 1996, the reasonable expectation was that at the end of the 30 month term of the lease, the equipment would be worth $10,000. However, due to the failure of the computers to be Y2K compliant, as of January 12, 1999 the computers are worth $0. Is the agreement a true lease or a disguised security interest?
5) Same facts as in #4 except on July 12, 1996 the reasonable expectation is that the computers will be worth $0 at the end of term of the lease. True lease?
6) Laura has no right to terminate and the lease provides that at the end of the term Laura can become the owner of the computers by paying an additional $500. True lease?
7) The lease provides that Laura is to pay for services and maintenance of the computers as well as any taxes and insurance. She contends that this proves the agreement is a disguised security interest because the agreement confers indicia of ownership upon her. If this were a true lease, according to Laura, the lessor as owner would have an expectation that at the end of the term he would regain possession and therefore would retain the indicia of ownership.
8) Assume that at the time of contracting the computers were expected to have a value of $30,000 by the end of the lease term. However, the lease provides that Laura is obligated to renew the lease for another 30 months for $1,00 per month. Is this a true lease?
9) Assume that at the time of contracting, the computers were expected to have a value of $5,000 at the end of the lease term. The lease granted Laura the option to renew the lease for 6 months for $800 per month. Is this a true lease?
10) At the time of contracting, the computers were expected to have a value of $30,000 by the end of the lease term. The lease contained no option to renew or to become the owner, and the lessee was not required to renew the lease. Nevertheless, at the end of the lease term, Laura renewed for another 30 months at $1,000 per month. Was the lease a true lease at the end of the first term? Has the lease changed its character and become something else at the end of the second term?
11) Does the scheme employed by §1-201(37) make sense in the case of new equipment employing advanced technology? Can the parties make any reasonable estimate of the "remaining economic life" of advanced computer systems? An unanticipated breakthrough next month may make equipment purchased in December obsolete by next May. On the other hand, the Boeing 707 was anticipated to have a useful life of twelve years, but actually had a much longer one.
TAYLOR v. SUBWAY EQUIPMENT LEASING CORP.
209 B.R. 482 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1997)
KENNETH J. MEYERS, Bankruptcy Judge.
This matter is before the Court on cross-motions for summary judgment on Banterra Bank's Complaint to Determine Extent, Validity, and Priority of Liens. The issue before the Court is whether an agreement between the debtor and the defendant constitutes a "true lease" or whether it is, in fact, a disguised security agreement pursuant to s 1-201(37) of the Illinois Uniform Commercial Code.
The debtor in this case, Susan Elaine Taylor, owned several Subway Sandwich Shops in southern Illinois. In August 1993, she entered into an agreement with the defendant, Subway Equipment Leasing Corporation ("Subway"), to "lease" equipment valued at $26,009.75 for her restaurant in Herrin, Illinois. Pursuant to the terms of the agreement, debtor, in addition to making a security deposit of $2,500, was required to make monthly payments of $702.27 for a term of 60 months. Although Subway reserved the right to terminate the contract in the event of default, there was no provision that expressly allowed the debtor to terminate the agreement. The only way the debtor could be free of the obligations of the "lease" prior to expiration of the sixty month term was to purchase the equipment. Attached to the agreement was a "buyout calculation schedule" which indicated the buyout option price for the equipment after each month of the lease. According to that schedule, at the expiration of sixty months, the debtor had the option to purchase the equipment for $2,600.97. [FN1] The contract specifically provided that the debtor was entitled only to the exclusive use of the property and that title to the equipment would remain in Subway unless and until the debtor exercised the purchase option. Subway Lease, p 16.
FN1. The contract provided that Ms. Taylor could apply her security deposit against this amount so, at the conclusion of the "lease," she could own the equipment by paying an additional $100.97.
On February 7, 1994, the debtor executed a promissory note and security agreement in favor of the plaintiff, Banterra Bank ("Banterra"). In connection with that transaction, the debtor granted Banterra a security interest in the equipment that was the subject of the Subway agreement. At this time, the debtor had not exercised her option to purchase the equipment from Subway. Banterra *484 subsequently filed a UCC-1 financing statement with the Illinois Secretary of State evidencing its security interest. On February 28, 1996, the debtor filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy protection. Banterra then filed this adversary proceeding to determine the validity and priority of its lien. The parties agreed to have the subject equipment sold and the proceeds placed in the Court registry pending the resolution of this adversary. It is undisputed that the equipment was sold to a third party for $14,058.47.
Banterra argues that the contract between the debtor and Subway is not a "true lease," but is, rather, a security agreement subject to UCC filing requirements. The Bank maintains that because Subway failed to file a UCC financing statement perfecting its interest in the equipment, [FN2] its lien is superior to that of Subway's and, therefore, it is entitled to recover the proceeds of the sale. Subway, on the other hand, argues that its agreement with the debtor is, in fact, a lease which was violated by the debtor when she granted the Bank a security interest in the equipment. Subway maintains that the debtor actually had no ownership interest in the property to give to Banterra and that the Bank's lien, therefore, is void.
FN2. The agreement between the debtor and Subway authorized Subway to file a financing statement if it wished to do so. Paragraph 17 of that contract specifically states: "It is understood between the Lessor and the Lessee that this agreement is regarded by them as a true lease and not a contract for security[,] and the reservation by the Lessor of the right to file a financing statement is solely for the purpose of allowing it to maintain on record a notice of its right in the equipment." Subway Lease at p 17.
It is well established that the existence, nature, and extent of a security interest in property is controlled by state law. In re Powers, 983 F.2d 88 (7th Cir.1993); In re Meeks, BK No. 95-40734 (Bankr.S.D.Ill.Dec. 15, 1995). The standard for determining whether a transaction constitutes a "true lease" or a security agreement is set forth in Section 1-201(37) of the Illinois Uniform Commercial Code. Pursuant to that provision, [w]hether a transaction creates a lease or a security interest is determined by the facts of each case; however, a transaction creates a security interest if the consideration the lessee is to pay the lessor for the right to possession and use of the goods is an obligation for the term of the lease not subject to termination by the lessee; and * * * * * *
(d) the lessee has an option to become the owner of the goods for no additional consideration or nominal additional consideration upon compliance with the lease agreement.
810 ILCS 5/1-201(37) (emphasis added).
In any analysis under s 1-201(37), the intent of the parties is no longer the primary consideration. [FN3] Rather, the focus is on the "economic realities" of the transaction. Meeks at 4; In re Lerch, 147 B.R. 455, 460 (Bankr.C.D.Ill.1992); William D. Hawkland et al, Article 9: Secured Transactions; Sales of Accounts, Contract Rights and Chattel Paper s 9-102:04 (1996). Under this approach, the lease will be construed as a security interest as a matter of law if the debtor cannot terminate the lease and one of the enumerated requirements is satisfied. Lerch at 460. If the Court determines that the transaction is not a disguised security agreement*485 per se, it must then look at the specific facts of the case to determine whether the "economics of the transaction" suggest such a result. Id.; Meeks at 4.
FN3. Section 1-201(37) was amended effective January 1, 1992. The previous version of the statute required that the agreement be analyzed in light of the parties' intent. It stated, in pertinent part: Whether a lease is intended as security is to be determined by the facts of each case; however, (a) the inclusion of an option to purchase does not of itself make the lease one intended for security, and (b) an agreement that upon compliance with the terms of the lease the lessee shall become or has the option to become the owner of the property for no additional consideration or for a nominal consideration does not make the lease one intended for security. Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 26, p 1-201(37). Under the prior codification, the courts adopted numerous subjective tests to discern the parties' actual intent. However, because leases and security agreements can sometimes share common characteristics, these "tests" often produced unreliable and inconsistent results. For this reason, the section was amended to provide a more objective standard for distinguishing between the two types of transactions. See J. White & R. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code, s 30- 3(b) (4th ed.1995).
In determining whether the transaction in this case is a security agreement as a matter of law, the first issue the Court must address is whether the agreement is subject to termination by the debtor/lessee. While the defendant admits that the agreement does not expressly provide the debtor with the right to terminate the agreement, it maintains that the monthly "buyout" provisions in the contract are the equivalent of an option to terminate and should be construed as such. The Court disagrees.
The Seventh Circuit has issued two opinions which discuss a lessee's right to terminate a lease under s 1-201(37). In In re Marhoefer Packing Co., Inc., 674 F.2d 1139 (7th Cir.1982), the lessee entered into a four-year lease of equipment. The agreement provided that at the end of the lease term, the lessee could either terminate the contract and return the property with no further obligation, purchase the equipment for a substantial sum, or renew the contract for an additional four-year term. If the lessee chose to renew the lease, it was then given the option to purchase the equipment for one dollar at the conclusion of the term. The court, in explaining why the Marhoefer transaction was not a security agreement as a matter of law, stated: In our view, the conclusive presumption provided under [section 1- 201(37) ] applies only where the option to purchase for nominal consideration necessarily arises upon compliance with the lease (citation omitted). It does not apply where the lessee has the right to terminate the lease before that option arises with no further obligation to continue paying rent. Id. at 1142-43 (emphasis added). [FN4]
FN4. In support of its reasoning the Marhoefer court quoted: It is ... essential in order to make a conditional sale ... that the buyer should be bound to take title of the property, or at least to pay the price for it. Therefore, a lease which provides for a certain rent in installments is not a conditional sale if the buyer can terminate the transaction at any time by returning the property .... Id. at 1143 (quoting S. Williston, The Law Governing Sales of Goods at Common Law and Under the Uniform Sales Act s 336, p. 528 (1909)) (emphasis added).
Similarly, in Powers v. Royce Inc., 983 F.2d 88 (7th Cir.1993), the Seventh Circuit found that the agreement in question was a "true lease," even though it contained an option to purchase the goods for nominal consideration at the end of the lease term, because it allowed the lessee to terminate the agreement after the initial two-week rental period without any further obligation. In comparing the leases in Marhoefer and Powers, the court noted that the Marhoefer contract resemble[d] the Royce Agreements in one critical respect: under both agreements, the lessee was under no obligation to make the installment payments that would ultimately allow the lessee to exercise or refuse the option to own the goods.... In other words, [in the Marhoefer contract], because the lessee could terminate the lease at any time, the presence of an option to acquire the goods for a nominal price did not convert the leases into installment sales. The same conclusion applies to the Royce Agreements: even though the lessee [could] acquire the goods at the end of the lease's term, the lessee [was] under no obligation to make the payments that [would] allow him to exercise the option. Powers, 983 F.2d at 91 (emphasis added). See also TKO Equipment Co. v. C & G Coal Co., 863 F.2d 541, 543 (7th Cir.1988) (lease found to be a "true lease," even though it contained a buyout option, where lessee could have returned the goods without obligation).
Reasoning from these decisions, it follows that an option to terminate a lease differs from a buyout option in that, under a termination clause, a lessee is free to cease performance under the contract without incurring further obligation. In this case, the lease did not provide the debtor with the opportunity to terminate the agreement at any time. Rather, in order to be released from this agreement, the debtor was required to purchase the property pursuant to the defendant's buyout schedule. She could *486 not simply return the equipment to the defendant and walk away. The lease here was not subject to termination by the debtor and, therefore, satisfies the first criterion for finding a security agreement under s 1-201(37).
The Court must now address the second criterion, which is whether the option to purchase the equipment at the end of the lease constituted nominal consideration. Unfortunately, there is no "bright line" test for determining "nominal" consideration. Some courts have evaluated the nominality of an option price by comparing it to the total rent to be paid. National Equip. Rental Ltd. v. Priority Electronics Corp., 435 F.Supp. 236, 238-239 (E.D.N.Y.1977). Still others have compared the option price to the original cost of the equipment. Percival Constr. Co. v. Miller & Miller Auctioneers, 532 F.2d 166, 171 (10th Cir.1976). [FN5] The standard for determining nominality in the Seventh Circuit was announced in Marhoefer where the Court held:
FN5. The court in Percival Construction adopted a "percentage test" as its guide for determining nominality. There, the court held that an option price that was less than 25% of the property's original value constituted nominal consideration. 532 F.2d at 171. Similarly, White and Summers take the position that payment of less than 50% of the predicted fair market value of the equipment should be considered nominal. 4 J. White & R. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code, s 30-3 (4th ed.1995). This Court declines to adopt such guidelines. Rather, the determination of nominality shall be made based on the facts and circumstances of each case.
[I]n determining whether an option price is nominal, the proper figure to compare it with is not the actual fair market value of the leased goods at the time the option arises, but their fair market value at that time as anticipated by the parties when the lease is signed.
Marhoefer, 674 F.2d at 1144-1145. See also In re Triple B Oil Producers, Inc., 75 B.R. 461 (Bankr.S.D.Ill.1987). [7] The parties here have stipulated that the equipment was worth $26,009.75 at the time the lease was signed. Further, there was evidence at the hearing on summary judgment indicating that the projected fair market value of the equipment after 60 months would be fifty-percent (50%) of its original value, or $13,004.88. Gilbert Stern Aff., Supp. to Pltf.'s Mot.Sum.Judg. at 2. [FN6] Pursuant to the Subway agreement, the debtor had the option to purchase the equipment after 60 months for $2,600.97 or approximately twenty-percent (20%) of that projected fair market value. Banterra argues that such an option price is "clearly nominal." The Court disagrees.
FN6. At the hearing on summary judgment, when asked whether he disputed the valuation of the equipment contained in Mr. Stern's affidavit, Subway's counsel stated that he did not dispute the value so much as the fact that the plaintiff's valuation focused only on the option price at the end of the lease and not on the other option prices that were offered to the debtor/lessee throughout the course of the lease. In its brief Subway asserted that the projected fair market value of the equipment at the end of the 60-month term was the stated option price of $2,600.97. Def's Mem. Opp. Pltf's Mot. Sum. Judg. at 7.
Section 1-201(37)(x) of the Illinois Uniform Commercial Code provides, in pertinent part, that additional consideration is nominal if "it is less than the lessee's reasonably predictable cost of performing under the lease agreement if the option is not exercised." 810 ILCS 5/1-201(37)(x). This codification of what has traditionally been referred to as the "economic realities" test focuses on whether the lessee has, in light of all of the facts and circumstances, no sensible alternative but to exercise the purchase option. In re Fogelsong 88 B.R. 194 (Bankr.C.D.Ill.1988). See also 1D Peter F. Coogan et. al, Secured Transactions under U.C.C. s 30.02[4][c][iii] (1990). Under this test, if only a fool would fail to exercise the purchase option, the option price is generally considered nominal and the transaction characterized as a disguised security agreement. Fogelson at 196; 4 J. White & R. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code s 30-3 at p. 13 (4th ed.1995). Applying this test to the facts here, it is evident that the option price representing twenty-percent of the equipment's projected fair market value is not so "economically compelling" that a lessee would have no reasonable alternative but to exercise the purchase option, and, therefore, this option amount does not constitute nominal *487 consideration. [FN7] See Western Enterprises, Inc. v. Arctic Office Machines, Inc., 667 P.2d 1232 (Alaska 1983) (court held that lower court finding that purchase option price in purported lease of 20% of value of property was not nominal).
FN7. Admittedly, the similarity between the amount of the security deposit and the amount of the final buyout is suspect. However, because the lease reserves to the lessee the option to have the deposit returned, the Court is constrained to find that $2,600.97 is the buyout amount rather than $100.
Having concluded that the option price in this case is not nominal, the Court cannot, as a matter of law, categorize this contract as a security agreement under s 1-201(37). However, this conclusion does not necessarily render summary judgment inappropriate. Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56; In re Stevens, No. 90-31144, Adv. No. 91- 3061, slip op. at 2 (Bankr.S.D.Ill. Nov. 11, 1992). In this case, there is no dispute between the parties as to the material facts. Therefore, the Court can proceed to analyze the agreement in light of the following factors to determine whether the economics of the transaction indicate a security agreement rather than a "true lease": (1) whether the lessee has the option to renew the lease or to become the owner of the property; (2) whether the amount of rent exceeds the fair market value of the property; (3) whether the debtor is responsible for payment of taxes, insurance and other costs incident to ownership; and (4) whether the useful life of the property exceeds the length of the term of the lease. In re Meeks, No. 95-40734, slip op. at 5 (Bankr.S.D.Ill.Dec. 15, 1995). See also Marhoefer, 674 F.2d 1139; In re Spears, 146 B.R. 772 (Bankr.S.D.Ill.1992).
Although the agreement in this case does not grant the debtor a renewal option, it does grant the debtor an option to become the owner of the equipment. Section 1-201(37) specifically provides that "[a] transaction does not create a security agreement merely because it provides that ... the lessee has an option to renew the lease or to become the owner of the goods...." 810 ILCS 5/1-201(37)(c) (emphasis added). In evaluating the circumstances under which the existence of an option might create a security agreement, the Seventh Circuit has focused on whether the lessee has the right to terminate the agreement prior to exercising the purchase option. In Marhoefer the court held that the inclusion of a purchase option does not necessarily create a security agreement if the lessee also has a right to terminate the contract at any time prior to the option arising. Marhoefer 674 F.2d at 1143. Similarly, in In re Powers, 983 F.2d 88 (7th Cir.1993), the court concluded that the agreement in that case was a "true lease" because "even though the lessee [could] acquire the goods at the end of the lease's term, the lessee [was] under no obligation to make the payments that [would] allow him to exercise that option." Id. at 91. As explained above, the lessee in this case did not have the right to terminate the agreement at any time. The only way she could unburden herself from the lease obligations was to purchase the equipment. This rigidity suggests that the agreement in this case was not a lease but, rather, was one intended for security.
Second, the Court must consider whether the amount of rental payments due under the lease exceeds the fair market value of the property. Courts have generally held that "[i]f the total rental payments under the lease equal or exceed the purchase price, then a security agreement is indicated." 1D Coogan, Secured Transactions Under U.C.C. s 30.02[4][c][v] at 30-66. While the importance of this test has been reduced under the amendments to s 1-201(37), it is not without relevance. Under the current version of s 1-201(37), [a] transaction does not create a security interest merely because it provides that: (a) the present value of the consideration the lessee is obligated to pay the lessor for the right to possession and use of the goods is substantially equal to or *488 greater than the fair market value of the goods at the time the lease is entered into.... 810 ILCS 5/1-201(37)(a) (emphasis added). Again, although the Court cannot rely on this factor exclusively in classifying a contract as a security agreement, it is still an important consideration in evaluating the economics of the transaction. Here, the parties agree that the original value of the equipment was $26,009.75. Pursuant to the terms of the agreement, the debtor was obligated to make monthly rental payments of $702.27 to Subway for a period of sixty months. At the conclusion of the lease, the debtor would have paid $42,136.20 for the equipment, an amount substantially more than its fair market value. Therefore, this, too, is indicative of a security agreement rather than a lease.
An analysis of the third factor further indicates that the agreement is not a lease but a security agreement. Under the agreement, the lessee bears all costs of insurance, taxes, and maintenance for the equipment as well as the risk of loss in the event of damage to the property. The Court is aware that the Seventh Circuit places minimal emphasis on this factor, having stated, in Marhoefer, that "[c]osts such as taxes, insurance and repairs are necessarily borne by one party or the other. They reflect less the true character of the transaction than the strength of the parties' respective bargaining positions." Marhoefer at 1146. However, the assignment of costs and risk in this case, when coupled with the fact that Subway disclaimed all warranties that are generally found in a lease, is a relevant consideration tending to show the agreement is not a "true lease." See In re Maritt, 155 B.R. 12, 13 (Bankr.D.Idaho 1993) (lessor's disclaimer of warranties is a relevant consideration in determining the actual nature of the parties' agreement).
By contrast, the final factor that must be analyzed, whether the useful life of the property exceeds the length of the term of the lease, supports a finding that the agreement is a lease. In general, courts have held that where the useful life of the property exceeds the term of the lease, the agreement is, in fact, a true lease. Marhoefer at 1145. Although there was conflicting evidence at the hearing on summary judgment concerning the projected fair market value of the equipment at the end of the lease period, this discrepancy is irrelevant. Banterra's evidence indicates that after 60 months, the equipment in question would retain fifty-percent of its value ($13,000). Gilbert Stern Aff., Supp. to Pltf.'s Mot. Sum. Judg. at 2. Subway, on the other hand, argued that the fair market value of the equipment after 60 months would be only $2,600. It is undisputed that the property has subsequently been sold to a third party for $14,058.47. Thus, regardless of the figure the Court uses, it is evident the useful life of the property in this case would exceed the term of the lease.
Although the analysis under this final test favors a finding of a lease, consideration of all of the other factors leads the Court to conclude that the agreement is not a lease, but is, in fact, a security agreement. The problem with agreements such as the one in this case is that the lessors/drafters attempt to draft the document so that it is capable of functioning as either a lease or a security agreement, depending on the situation. While it is true that the agreement here has several characteristics of a lease, other more compelling features require its interpretation as a security agreement, the most significant being the absence of a right to terminate the agreement by the lessee. Therefore, for the reasons stated herein, the Court finds that the subject agreement is a security agreement rather than a true lease. Plaintiff Banterra Bank's motion for summary judgment is granted, and defendant's cross- motion for summary judgment is, accordingly, denied.
IN RE MURRAY.
191 B.R. 309 (Bankr. E.D. 1996)
THOMAS M. TWARDOWSKI, Bankruptcy Judge.
Before the court is the motion of CoreStates Bank, N.A. ("movant") requesting relief from the automatic stay and/or turnover of property ("motion") in the possession of debtor, Edmond C. Murray ("debtor"). The issue presented is whether a document denominated "Motor Vehicle Lease and Disclosure Statement" ("Lease") is in fact a "true lease" or alternatively, an installment purchase agreement with a security interest. For the reasons stated herein, we conclude that the Lease is a true lease subject to assumption or rejection by debtor pursuant to s 365(a) of the United States Bankruptcy Code ("Code"), 11 U.S.C. s 365(a). Consistent with this conclusion, debtor shall be provided an opportunity either to reject the Lease or to assume the Lease and cure past defaults.
It is well established that the determination of whether a particular
agreement constitutes a lease or a security agreement for purposes of 11
U.S.C. s 365 is to be made by reference to state law. E.g. In re Bumgardner,
183 B.R. 224, 225 (Bankr.D.Idaho 1995); Phoenix Pipe & Tube, L.P.,
154 B.R. 197, 199 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1993). Turning to the law of Pennsylvania,
we find that 13 Pa.C.S.A. s 1201 provides the applicable standard for determining
whether a transaction creates a lease or a security agreement.
We observe that 13 Pa.C.S.A. s 1201 was amended in 1992 to incorporate
into Pennsylvania law revised s 1-201(37) of Article 2A of the Uniform
Commercial Code ("UCC"). See U.C.C. Art. 2A, s 1- 201(37) (Supp.1995) (historical
notes); 1A J. White & R. Summers Article 2A Leases of Goods 8 (3d ed.
1991). The former version of the statute was much less detailed than its
current iteration and led to the development of inconsistent views among
courts regarding the criteria to be applied in determining whether an agreement
creates a true lease or a security interest. See e.g. Carlson v. Giacchetti,
35 Mass.App.Ct. 57, 616 N.E.2d 810, 812 (1993); White & Summers at
p. 14. In contrast, the revised statute provides standardized provisions
intended to focus a court's inquiry on the most salient criteria for distinguishing
between true leases and those intended for security. White & Summers
at p. 9. In the words of one commentator, in amending U.C.C. s 1-201(37)
the drafters attempted to "re-assert the significance of residual value
as the touchstone of the common law definition of true leases." Naples,
A Review and Analysis of the New Article 2A, 93 Com.L.J. 342, 349 (1988);
accord, Bumgardner, 183 B.R. at 228; Carlson, 616 N.E.2d at 813.
[Portions omitted.]
We observe that revised U.C.C. s 1-201(37) consists of several new paragraphs
and detailed standards which are to be employed in determining the lease/security
interest issue. The following analysis, established by the Bankruptcy Court
in In re Lerch, 147 B.R. 455 (Bankr.C.D.Ill.1992) (applying I.C. s 28-1-201(37),
an Illinois statute that is substantially similar to 13 Pa.C.S.A. s 1201),
provides guidance in applying the new statute. Accord, In re Zaleha, 159
B.R. 581, 583 (Bankr.D.Idaho 1993). The initial portion of the first sentence
of the second unnumbered paragraph contains the basic direction that the
determination is made based on the facts of each case. The latter portion
of the first sentence of the second unnumbered paragraph starting with
the word "however" creates an exception to the basic direction that the
determination is made on the facts of each case, as it provides that without
looking at all the facts, a lease will be construed as a security interest
if a debtor cannot terminate the lease, and if one of the four enumerated
terms is present in the lease. Absent a mandated classification [e.g. that
the agreement is a security interest], the determination is based on the
facts of the case. At this point the third unnumbered paragraph comes into
effect. Focussing on the economics of the transaction, it states that a
security interest is not created merely because it contains any of the
five terms enumerated in [that] paragraph. Id. at 460.
Having thus explored the background of the changes made to 13 Pa.C.S.A.
s 1201(6), as well as their practical application, we turn to the facts
of this case. Here, we observe that since debtor has the ability to terminate
the Lease unilaterally prior to the end of the lease term, the Lease cannot
be deemed a security interest as a matter of law under the exception provided
in 13 Pa.C.S.A. s 1201(6)(i). [FN8] Lerch, 147 B.R. at 460. Therefore,
the lease/security interest issue must be "determined by the facts of [the]
case." 13 Pa.C.S.A. s 1201(6). Our attention is thus directed to an examination
of the non-exclusive list of factors enumerated in 13 Pa.C.S.A. s 1201(6)(ii).
Lerch, 147 B.R. at 460. The key emphasis at this point of the inquiry is
on whether movant retains a meaningful residual interest in the Vehicle.
See Bumgardner, 183 B.R. at 228; see also In re Aspen Impressions, Inc.,
94 B.R. 861, 866 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1989) (discussing the revisions made to
U.C.C. s 1-201(37) prior to their enactment in Pennsylvania).
FN8. Had debtor not been granted the right to terminate the Lease prior
to the expiration of its term and if one of the four factors outlined in
13 Pa.C.S.A. s 1201(6)(i)(A)-(D) could be established, the Lease would
be deemed a security agreement under s 1201(6)(i).
Our analysis is facilitated by the fact that the Lease contains a fixed
price purchase option. As explained by the Bankruptcy Court in Lerch, this
circumstance was used in an example discussed in the Comments. In pertinent
part, the Comments state: The relationship of the second paragraph of this
subsection to the third paragraph ... deserves to be explored. The fixed
price purchase option provides a useful example. A fixed price purchase
option in a lease does not in and of itself create a security interest.
This is particularly true if the fixed price is equal to or greater *316
than the reasonably predictable fair market of the goods at the time the
option is to be performed. A security interest is created only if the option
price is nominal and the conditions stated in the introduction to the second
paragraph of this subsection are met. U.C.C. s 1-201(37) (historical notes)
(emphasis added).
In the instant case, the only evidence in the record concerning the
reasonably predictable fair market value of the Vehicle at the time that
the purchase option was to be performed is the Lease itself, which establishes
an End of Term Price of $6,894.47, and the testimony of movant's witness
Hirst. Hirst testified that the End of Term Price represented movant's
estimate of the end of term residual value of the Vehicle calculated at
the time the Lease was executed. Movant's estimate of the fair market value
of the Vehicle is consistent with 13 Pa.C.S.A. s 1201(6)(iii)(B) which
generally provides that "reasonably predictable fair market value" is to
be determined with reference to the facts and circumstances extant at the
time the transaction is entered into, not at a later time, e.g., at the
end of the lease term when the actual fair market value can be determined
with certainty. Id. Debtor, whose burden it is prove that the Lease is
other than what it purports to be, Zaleha, 159 B.R. at 586, neither offered
evidence to rebut movant's proof of the Vehicle's estimated residual value
of $6,894.47 nor introduced any evidence to show that this sum is nominal.
Thus, the fact that the fixed option purchase price is equal to movant's
estimate of the residual value strongly supports the conclusion that the
Lease is a true lease. Lerch, 147 B.R. at 461; Comments, U.C.C. s 1-201(37)
(historical notes).
Debtor contends, however, that the Lease creates a security interest
because under its terms he has assumed responsibility for many of the usual
semblances of ownership of a motor vehicle, e.g. the risk of loss and payment
of taxes and fees, maintenance costs, etc. The statute is clear, however,
that a transaction does not create a security interest merely because "the
lessee assumes risk of loss of the goods, or agrees to pay taxes, insurance,
filing, recording or registration fees, or service or maintenance costs
with respect to the goods." 13 Pa.C.S.A. s 1201(6)(ii)(B). Contrary to
debtor's position, these kinds of factors are typical of "net" leases,
Lerch, 147 B.R. at 461, and "reflect less the character of the transaction
than the strength of the parties' respective bargaining positions." In
Marhoefer Packing Co., Inc., 674 F.2d 1139, 1146 (7th Cir.1982).
Debtor also contends that the economics of the transaction compels
the conclusion that it is a security agreement rather than a true lease.
In this regard, debtor posits that the Lease is identical to an installment
purchase, and should therefore be construed as creating a security interest,
because the present value of the lease payments and the end of term price
is approximately equal to the price at which movant purchased the Vehicle.
[FN9] This argument, however, ignores subsections (A) and (E) of 13 Pa.C.S.A.
s 1201(6)(ii), which state that a transaction does not create a security
interest merely because the present value of the lease payments is "substantially
equal to or greater than the fair market value of the goods at the time
the lease is entered into," id. at s 1201(6)(ii)(A), or because the lessee
can become the owner of the Vehicle by paying a sum that is equal to its
"reasonably predictable fair market value" at the end of the lease term.
Id. at s 1201(6)(ii)(E).
FN9. Hirst testified that movant purchased the Vehicle from D'Ambrosio's
Dodge-North, Inc. for the sum of $23,372.00.
Furthermore, in order for the Lease to have created a security interest
it must have provided debtor with some ownership interest in the Vehicle.
In re Winston, 181 B.R. 589, 594 (Bankr.N.D.Ala.1995). The evidence establishes,
however, that the Lease provided debtor only with the use and possession
of the Vehicle which was at all times owned by movant. The evidence further
established that debtor's use of the Vehicle was defined by a set term,
at the completion of which debtor was obligated to either return *317 the
Vehicle or pay movant a fixed purchase price equal to the reasonably predictable
fair market value of the Vehicle at the end of the term. Neither anything
in the Lease nor the evidence presented at the hearing supports debtor's
claim to an ownership interest in the Vehicle.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that debtor has not satisfied his
burden of demonstrating that the Lease is a security agreement rather than
a true lease as denominated on its face. Consistent with this conclusion,
debtor shall be provided a reasonable opportunity to assume or reject the
Lease pursuant to the provisions of 11 U.S.C. s 365. An Order consistent
with the foregoing Opinion shall be entered.
JARRELLS v. MR. C'S RENT TO OWN
205 B.R. 994 (M.D. Ga. 1997)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
ROBERT F. HERSHNER, Jr., Chief Judge.
WITNESS: /s/ Conger RENTER: Lilla Lipton LESSOR: Mr Cs CO-RENTER: Johnnie
B. Jarrells
*996 Respondent later signed on June 21, 1996, a Rental Purchase Agreement
for an air conditioner. This agreement is on the same form as the prior
Rental Purchase Agreement for the living room furniture. The agreement
for the air conditioner provides that the rental term is weekly. The rent
is $28 per week. The estimated fair market value of the air conditioner
is $595. Respondent must renew the agreement for fifty-two weeks if she
wants to own the air conditioner.
The Rental Purchase Agreements provide that the rental terms are week
to week for the air conditioner and month to month for the furniture. Respondent
can return the property at the end of any term without any further obligation.
Respondent is not required to renew the agreements or to purchase the property.
Movant is responsible for maintaining and paying any taxes assessed on
the property.
Respondent essentially was current on her payments to Movant when Respondent
filed a petition under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code on July 2, 1996.
Respondent's Chapter 13 plan proposes to pay in full the remaining lease
payments, plus interest, to Movant over the three-and-one-half-year term
of the Chapter 13 plan. Respondent's Chapter 13 plan treats Movant as having
fully secured claims. Respondent argues that the Rental Purchase Agreements
are secured sales agreements which can be modified through her Chapter
13 plan.
Respondent has worked for the same employer for twenty-five years.
Respondent cannot afford the weekly and monthly payments called for in
the Rental Purchase Agreements. Respondent, however, can pay the balance
owed to Movant over the term of her Chapter 13 plan.
Movant argues that the Rental Purchase Agreements are true leases.
Movant argues that Respondent must faithfully perform the terms of the
agreements if she wants to retain the furniture and air conditioner.
The issue presented is whether the Rental Purchase Agreements are true
leases or secured sales agreements. "The legislative history to section
365 of the Bankruptcy Code states that whether a lease constitutes a security
agreement should be determined by state law. A security interest in personal
property is subject to Georgia's version of the uniform Commercial Code."
National Traveler, Inc. v. Paccom Leasing Corp. (In re National Traveler,
Inc.), 110 B.R. 619, 620 (Bankr.M.D.Ga.1990). In In re Paz, [FN2] Judge
Walker, speaking for the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of
Georgia, stated:
FN2. 179 B.R. 743 (Bankr.S.D.Ga.1995).
The Georgia Legislature amended O.C.G.A. s 11-1-201(37) in 1993 to
provide a codified distinction between documents creating security interests
and lease agreements. The agreement before the Court, having been entered
into after the effective date of the amendments, is subject to scrutiny
under the amended law. 179 B.R. at 746.
The court also stated:
The 1993 amendment to section 11-1-201(37) is largely consistent with
Georgia case law prior to the amendment. The amendment provides a yardstick
for the Court to measure the facts of each individual case. 179 B.R. at
747.
Section 11-1-201(37) of the Georgia Code [FN3] provides: [Omitted.]
FN3. O.C.G.A. s 11-1-201(37) (Supp.1996).
In National Traveler, Inc. v. Paccom Leasing Corp. (In re National
Traveler, Inc.), [FN4] this Court stated:
FN4. 110 B.R. 619 (Bankr.M.D.Ga.1990).
Georgia law does not require "magic words" to create a valid security
interest. Rather, the court must refer to the general law of contracts
and determine whether the parties intended to create a security agreement.
United States v. Hollie (In re Hollie), 42 B.R. 111, 117 (Bankr.M.D.Ga.1984).
The determining factor is the intention of the parties at the time the
agreement was entered into as construed in light of facts and circumstances
as they existed at that time. Citizens & Southern Equipment Leasing,
Inc. v. Atlanta Federal Savings & Loan Assoc., 144 Ga.App. 800, 805,
243 S.E.2d 243, 247 (1978). A document is construed according to the intent
of the parties as ascertained from factors that distinguish true leases
from security agreements. Leasing Service Corp. v. River City Construction,
Inc., 743 F.2d 871, 878 (11th Cir.1984). The best test for determining
the intent of an agreement which provides for an option to buy is a comparison
of the option price with the market value of the equipment at the time
the option is to be exercised. Such a comparison shows whether the lessee
is paying actual value or acquiring the property at a substantially lower
price. Mejia v. Citizens & Southern Bank, 175 Ga.App. [80] at 82, 332
S.E.2d [170] at 172 [ (1985) ]; Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Dowdy, 159 Ga.App.
at 667, 284 S.E.2d at 680. If the lessee has the option to become the owner
of the property for no additional or for a nominal consideration, the lease
is deemed to be intended for security. Any determination of whether consideration
is nominal must be made on a case-by-case basis. Mejia v. Citizens &
Southern Bank, 175 Ga.App. at 82, 332 S.E.2d at 172. 110 B.R. at 621.
Georgia courts also have considered other factors in determining the
intent of the parties. In Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Dowdy, [FN5] the Georgia
Court of Appeals stated:
FN5. 159 Ga.App. 666, 284 S.E.2d 679 (1981), overruled on other grounds,
Adams v. D & D Leasing Co. of Georgia, Inc., 191 Ga.App. 121, 381 S.E.2d
94 (1989), cert. denied.
Whether [an agreement] is intended as security is to be determined
by the facts of each case; the name which the parties give it is not conclusive....
Other factors present in this case which are listed in Davis Brothers as
quoted from In re Transcontinental Industries, Inc., 3 UCC Rep. 235 [1965
WL 8366] (N.D.Georgia 1965) as tending to establish that the transaction
is a conditional sale are: the lessor's purchase of the equipment from
a supplier; the requirement that the lessee be responsible for the payment
of all taxes, insurance and expenses for repairs, an initial down payment,
and an additional payment of security deposit. ... The predominate opinion
appears to be that a true lease may or may not contain an option to purchase,
its effect rather than its presence being the predominative [sic] element.
284 S.E.2d at 680-81.
In Woods v. General Electric Credit Auto Lease, Inc., [FN6] the Georgia
Court of Appeals stated:
FN6. 187 Ga.App. 57, 369 S.E.2d 334 (1988).
Although the [car lease agreement] does contain certain provisions
more likely to be found in a security transaction, for example, that the
appellant and her husband would be responsible for all necessary vehicle
repairs, vehicle maintenance, taxes and vehicle insurance, examination
of the *999 document reveals that these factors are not controlling. Mejia,
supra 175 Ga.App. at 82, 332 S.E.2d 170.
The Agreement specifically is labeled a lease and consistently refers
to appellant and her husband as lessees. It includes the original lessor's
assignment to the appellee of "all right, title and interest in and to
the leased vehicle and to this lease...." Moreover, it expressly provides
"that this ... is a true lease...." While these factors are not dispositive
in construing the nature of the Agreement, see generally, Mejia, supra
at 81, 332 S.E.2d 170 and Ford Motor Credit Co., supra 159 Ga.App. at 667,
284 S.E.2d 679, they are entitled to reasonable weight, as they are an
indicator of the parties' contractual intent and the purpose of the Agreement.
Other factors indicative of a true lease, and which are present in
this case include (a) that the original lessor was apparently in the automobile
leasing business, Mejia, supra 175 Ga.App. at 82, 332 S.E.2d 170; (b) that
the lessor did not require a financing statement, Mejia, supra at 82, 332
S.E.2d 170; and (c) that the Agreement expressly provided that the lessees
"have absolutely no equity or other ownership rights in the vehicle," unless
they exercise their option to purchase the vehicle, see generally Ford
Motor Credit Co., supra 159 Ga.App. at 667, 284 S.E.2d 679, and cases cited
therein. Additionally, the leasing of automobiles by individuals, as well
as by business entities, is not an uncommon practice today. ... This Agreement
on its face required no "initial down payment," and the security deposit,
which was refundable, was roughly equivalent to the amount required for
a monthly leasing payment. Such an amount is not unreasonable and entirely
consistent with a lease transaction.
369 S.E.2d at 335-36.
Turning to the case at bar, the Court notes that the Rental Purchase
Agreements contain provisions that are found both in a true lease and in
a sales agreement. Respondent is not required to make any additional payments
when the agreements terminate to own the property. Movant's trade name
implies that customers who rent will someday own the property. The agreements
are entitled "Rental Purchase Agreement." These factors support Respondent's
contention that the agreements are secured sales agreements.
The agreements, however, also contain provisions found in a true lease.
Respondent can return the property at the end of any weekly or monthly
term without any further obligation. Respondent is not required to renew
the agreements or to purchase the property. Respondent was not required
to make a down payment or security deposit. Movant is responsible for maintaining
the property and paying any taxes assessed on the property. The agreements
expressly provide that, by signing the agreements, Respondent intends to
rent rather than purchase the property. The agreements expressly provide
that Respondent will not own the property unless she buys it or acquires
ownership as provided by the terms of the agreements.
The Court, having considered the facts presented and the applicable
Georgia law, is persuaded that the Rental Purchase Agreements are true
leases.
IN RE PAZ
179 B.R. 743 (S.D. Ga. 1995)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
JAMES D. WALKER, Jr., Bankruptcy Judge.
This matter comes before the Court on Motion for Relief From Stay filed by Gold Key Lease, Inc., ("Gold Key") a creditor in this Chapter 13 case. At issue is the characterization of an agreement as either a lease which must be assumed or rejected, or a security instrument capable of bifurcation into secured and unsecured component claims. This is a core matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. s 157(b)(2)(G). Based on the following discussion, the Court will deny Gold Key's Motion for Relief From Stay subject to the requirement that Debtor amend his plan.
NATIONSBANK OF NORTH CAROLINA, N.A.,
v.
CAPITAL ASSOCIATES INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
916 F. Supp. 549 (W.D. N. Caro. 1996).
MULLEN, District Judge.
THIS MATTER comes before the court following a non-jury trial on October 4, 1994. This case is a declaratory judgment action filed by the plaintiff, NationsBank of North Carolina, N.A., as Trustee for the NationsBank and Designated Subsidiaries Retirement Plan and Trust ("NationsBank") against the defendant, Capital Associates International, Inc. ("Capital Associates") seeking a determination as to the ownership and title to certain property located in Mecklenburg County, North Carolina. More specifically, the action seeks a determination of ownership and title with regard to a specified list of property hereinafter referred to as the "disputed items." The issue of damages is also before the court.
NEC TECHNOLOGIES
v.
NELSON
267 Ga. 390, 478 S.E.2d 769 (1996)
HUNSTEIN, Justice.
BMW FINANCIAL SERVICES,N.A.,INC.
v.
SMOKE RISE CORPORATION
226 Ga. App. 469, 486 S.E.2d 629 (1997)
POPE, Presiding Judge.
In this action to enforce an excess mileage provision in a motor vehicle
lease, the plaintiff lessor appeals from the trial court's denial of its
motion for summary judgment. Because there is no question of material fact
regarding plaintiff's right to enforce the provision, we granted its application
for interlocutory appeal and now reverse. Defendant Smoke Rise Corporation
leased a BMW automobile from plaintiff, and the corporation's president,
defendant William Probst, personally guaranteed the lease. The lease, as
modified in an extension agreement, provided that at the end of the lease
term defendants could purchase the vehicle for $16,863.75, the estimated
end-of-term wholesale value of the vehicle. It also provided that if defendants
returned the vehicle rather than exercising their option to purchase it,
they would have to pay a charge of "up to 15 cents" for each mile the vehicle
had been driven in excess of 85,011 miles. Defendants chose not to purchase
the vehicle and returned it with an odometer reading of 180,409 miles,
but they refused to pay for the excess mileage. Plaintiff seeks $14,309.70,
which is 15 cents times 95,398 (the difference between 180,409 and 85,011
miles), plus attorney fees.
In their defense, Smoke Rise and Probst contend the excess mileage
provision is unconscionable because the $14,309.70 charge is almost as
much as the projected end-of-term value of the car, and is considerably
more than their experts say the actual value of the car is with 180,409
miles. Unconscionability is evaluated by looking at the circumstances at
the time the contract was originally made, however, and determining whether,
in light of the commercial needs of the particular trade involved, the
agreement is one which " 'no sane man not acting under a delusion would
make and ... no honest man would take advantage of.' [Cits.]" R.L. Kimsey
Cotton Co. v. Ferguson, 233 Ga. 962, 966(3), 214 S.E.2d 360 (1975); accord
Zepp v. Mayor etc. of Athens, 180 Ga.App. 72, 79(2), 348 S.E.2d 673 (1986).
See also OCGA s 11- 2A-108. In the context of a corporation leasing a luxury
vehicle, an excess mileage charge of 15 cents per mile is not unreasonable
and certainly does not shock the conscience. Such a charge serves the necessary
commercial function of compensating for out-of-the-ordinary usage which
will affect the residual value of the car. If *470 at the end of the term
defendants discovered the excess mileage charge was too high relative to
the value of the car, they could have exercised their option to purchase
it. But they did not do so, and now they cannot complain about a charge
they agreed to pay.
Defendants' argument that the provision is too indefinite to enforce
is also without merit. Plaintiff is entitled to anything up to 15 cents
per mile, and that includes 15 cents per mile. And the fact that it was
willing to take less earlier in the dispute does not undermine its right
to 15 cents per mile.
The excess mileage provision is clear and unambiguous and must be enforced
as written. See Saf-T-Green of Atlanta v. Lazenby Sprinkler Co., 169 Ga.App.
249, 250, 312 S.E.2d 163 (1983). Accordingly, the trial court erred in
denying plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.
Judgment reversed.
WALNUT EQUIPMENT LEASING CO.
v.
MORENO
643 So.2d 327 (La. Ct. App. 1994)
VICTORY, Judge.
Plaintiff, Walnut Equipment Leasing Company, appeals a trial court judgment rejecting its claims against defendants, Clarence and Glenda Moreno d/b/a P & M Texaco, for unpaid rent for the lease of a tire changer. We reverse and render.
Sometime prior to November 30, 1989, Larry Brown, a salesman for Webb
Equipment Company, Inc. ("Webb") of Shreveport, Louisiana, approached Clarence
and Glenda Moreno, d/b/a P & M Texaco (the "Morenos"), regarding the
sale of a tire changer for use in their automobile service station. After
Brown unloaded the machine and demonstrated its capabilities and safety
features, Mr. Moreno decided that it suited the station's needs and orally
agreed to either lease the tire changer or purchase it for $2,600.00. After
consulting two certified public accountants, Mr. Moreno opted to lease
the machine for tax purposes.
The lease was arranged through Walnut Equipment Leasing Company, Inc.
("Walnut"), a Pennsylvania corporation. Brown presented a Walnut lease
application to the Morenos, which described the exact tire **329 changer
selected (Hofmann TC 12 SE, Serial Number 1971091), listed P & M Texaco's
and Webb's addresses, and indicated that Brown was the Webb salesman responsible
for the transaction. On November 30, 1989, Mr. Moreno, on behalf of "P
& M Texaco Service," wrote a $312.00 check payable to Walnut, representing
the first monthly rental payment and the last two monthly rental payments,
as a security deposit.
Brown then presented a Walnut lease form to the Morenos, which was
signed by both of them sometime during December, 1989, and was accepted
by Walnut on January 4, 1990. According to the terms of the lease, the
Morenos *2 were to pay monthly rentals of $104.00 for 39 months. At the
end of the lease, the Morenos were to have no ownership interest in the
tire changer and no option to purchase the machine. Additionally, Paragraph
II of the lease contained a warranty disclaimer, which provided that Walnut
made no representations or warranties of any kind, express or implied,
as to the condition of the equipment, its merchantability or its fitness.
On January 4, 1990, Walnut issued a purchase order to Webb requesting purchase
of the Hofmann TC 12 SE, tire changer, Serial Number 1971091, and requesting
delivery to P & M Texaco. [FN1]
FN1. It is unclear when the tire changer was actually delivered. Mr.
Moreno testified that it was delivered before he wrote the November 30,
1989, check to Walnut. However, Walnut's president, Mr. Shapiro, testified
that it was customary for the equipment to be delivered only after Walnut
accepted the lease and issued a purchase order to the supplier. Apparently
the request for delivery of the tire changer to P & M Texaco in the
January 4, 1990, purchase order was merely a formality.
Mr. Moreno also signed a document entitled "Certificate of Acceptance
and Satisfaction," whereby he acknowledged receipt of the tire changer,
and stated that he read and understood the terms of the lease. The certificate
further provided that the Morenos had selected both the equipment and the
supplier from whom the tire changer was purchased, and that neither the
supplier nor the salesman were Walnut agents. Additionally, the certificate
stated that the Morenos understood that Walnut made no warranties, express
or implied, as to the condition of the equipment, and that Walnut would
not be liable to the Morenos for losses or damages caused by the equipment
or its use. Finally, the certificate provided that if the equipment did
not operate as represented by the supplier or if it was not satisfactory
for any reason, the Morenos would assert their claims solely against the
supplier, Webb, and would nevertheless pay Walnut all of the rent due under
the lease. *3
Walnut followed up the transaction by telephoning Mr. Moreno on two
different occasions to confirm that he was satisfied, and that he understood
the terms of the lease and his obligations thereunder. The contents of
both conversations were memorialized by Joan Demow, a Webb employee, through
a written telephone memorandum. The first telephone call was placed on
January 8, 1990. According to the memorandum, Mr. Moreno confirmed receipt
of the tire changer and stated that he was satisfied. He also acknowledged
that Walnut was not responsible for service, repairs or maintenance of
the leased equipment.
On or about February 2, 1990, the tire changer "blew up" while a P
& M Texaco employee was repairing a tire. The tire and rim being repaired
were damaged, and the tire changer was rendered unusable. Mr. Moreno contacted
Brown to advise of the malfunction, who later came out to the service station
to inspect the tire changer. After inspecting the machine, Brown decided
that it was necessary to take it to Webb, in Shreveport, for repair. A
few days later, Brown telephoned Mr. Moreno to inform him that it would
cost approximately $2,000.00 to repair the tire changer. Mr. Moreno objected
to the high cost of the repairs, since a new machine could be purchased
for $2,600.00.
The Morenos refused to pay for the repairs. They also discontinued
making monthly rental payments to Walnut. After making several oral and
written demands for payment, Walnut sued the Morenos in Pennsylvania, and
on August 1, 1990, obtained a "default" judgment for $5,463.64, representing
accelerated and back lease payments, late charges, collection fees and
taxes. On December **330 27, 1990, Walnut filed an "Ex Parte Petition for
Enforcement of Foreign Judgment," in *4 Caldwell Parish, Louisiana, requesting
that the court recognize the Pennsylvania judgment.
On January 31, 1991, the Morenos answered Walnut's petition to enforce
the Pennsylvania judgment. Therein, they generally denied Walnut's allegations
and specifically pled that the Pennsylvania court lacked personal jurisdiction
over them. They also claimed that the tire changer was defective and that
it was not suitable for the purposes for which it was intended. The Morenos
also reconvened against Walnut and Webb, claiming that the tire changer
should have been repaired pursuant to the warranty provisions affiliated
with the purchase/lease. The Morenos prayed for dismissal of Walnut's claims,
rescission of the lease, and attorney fees and costs.
[Portions omitted.]
After considering the testimony and other evidence presented, the *5
trial court ruled in favor of the Morenos, declaring the lease null and
void and ordering Walnut to refund all previously made payments. The trial
court concluded that:
... the lessor simply cannot be allowed to exact a waiver of the obligation
of warranting fitness from vices and defects while retaining the right
to collect rent for the entire thirty-nine (39) month term, even if equipment
proves defective less than one (1) month after commencement of the lease.
[Portions discussing choice of law omitted.]
*9 WAIVER OF WARRANTIES UNDER PENNSYLVANIA LAW Having found that Pennsylvania
law governs all aspects of the lease, except those relating to default,
remedies and charges, we now turn to the effectiveness of the waiver of
warranty provision under that state's law. [6] Pennsylvania's "Sales" articles
are based substantially upon those set forth in Article 2 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, and are located at 13 Pa.C.S.A. ss 2101 through 2725.
Although the transaction at issue involves a lease, rather than a sale,
the Pennsylvania courts have found that the "warranty" and "waiver of warranty"
provisions applicable to sales, 13 Pa.C.S.A. ss 2313 through 2316, may
be applied by analogy to leases. [FN4] Cucchi v. Rollins Protective Services
Co., 524 Pa. 514, 574 A.2d 565 (1990); Keblish v. Thomas Equipment, Ltd.,
427 Pa.Super. 93, 628 A.2d 840 (1993); Fetrow, Uniform Commercial Code--Pennsylvania
Applies Article 2 Warranty Provisions to Personal Property Lease Transactions--Cucchi
v. Rollins Protective Services, 64 Temp.L.Rev. 355 (1991).
FN4. It is noteworthy that, effective July 9, 1993, the Pennsylvania
legislature enacted the "Uniform Commercial Code Modernization Act," Act
No. 1992-97. By this legislation, Article 2A, Leases, was codified at 13
Pa.C.S.A. s 2A101 et seq. The Article 2A warranty provisions for leases
are essentially the same as those for sales.
The applicable warranties are set forth in 13 Pa.C.S.A. ss 2314 and
2315, which provide, in pertinent part, that: s 2314. Implied warranty;
merchantability; usage of trade (a) Sale by merchant.--Unless excluded
or modified (section 2316), a warranty that the goods shall be merchantable
is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with
respect to goods of that kind.... *10 (b) Merchantability standards for
goods.--Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as: * * * * * *
(3) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used.
s 2315. Implied warranty: fitness for particular purpose Where the seller
at the time of contracting has reason to know: (1) any particular purpose
for which the goods are required; and (2) that the buyer is relying on
the skill or judgment of the seller to select or furnish suitable goods;
**333 there is unless excluded or modified under s 2316 (relating to exclusion
or modification of warranties) an implied warranty that the goods shall
be fit for such purpose.
To exclude or modify the implied warranty of merchantability, according
to 13 Pa.C.S.A. s 2316, the written contract language must mention merchantability
and must be conspicuous. To exclude or modify the implied warranty of fitness,
the exclusion must be in writing and conspicuous. The statute also provides
that, "Language to exclude all implied warranties of fitness is sufficient
if it states, for example, that 'There are no warranties which extend beyond
the description on the face hereof.' "
A term is conspicuous when it is so written that a reasonable person
against whom it is to operate ought to have noticed it. 13 Pa.C.S.A. s
1201. See also, Keblish, supra; Moscatiello v. Pittsburgh Contractors Equipment
Company, 407 Pa.Super. 363, 595 A.2d 1190 (1991), appeal denied, 529 Pa.
650, 602 A.2d 860 (1992). Additionally, language in the body of a form
is conspicuous if it is in larger or other contrasting type or color. 13
Pa.C.S.A. s 1201.
Some of the important characteristics that Pennsylvania courts consider
when determining whether a reasonable person should have noticed the disclaimer
*11 include: (1) the placement of the clause in the document (beginning/end
or front/back of document); (2) the size of the disclaimer's print; and
(3) whether the disclaimer was highlighted or called to the reader's attention
by being in all caps or a different type style. Keblish, supra; Moscatiello,
supra; U.S. Leasing Corporation v. Stephenson Equipment, Inc., 230 Pa.Super.
181, 326 A.2d 472 (1974).
The waiver of warranty provision at issue provides:
II WARRANTIES--LESSEE AGREES THAT LESSOR HAS MADE NO REPRESENTATIONS
OR WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, NATURE OR DESCRIPTION, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED AS
WITH RESPECT TO ANY OTHER MATTER WHATSOEVER, INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION,
THE CONDITION OR USE OF THE EQUIPMENT, ITS MERCHANTABILITY, OR ITS FITNESS
FOR ANY PARTICULAR PURPOSE. (Caps and bold in original.) This provision
is located on the front side of the lease, which is one page in length
with printed information on both sides. Furthermore, it is located almost
directly in the middle of the front page of the lease, and is immediately
noticeable because it is in larger type, all caps and boldfaced. The majority
of the printed information is smaller in size, not boldfaced and not