Georgia State University
Law Review

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Volume 20

Number 3

Spring 2004

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Should Juvenile Adjudications Count as Convictions for Apprendi Purposes?

Kimberly L. Johnson

Introduction

The U.S. Supreme Court held in Apprendi v. New Jersey[1] that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”[2] The Court made an exception for prior convictions because the necessary procedural safeguards, (1) a trial by jury and (2) proof beyond a reasonable doubt, were presumably observed in the trial leading up to the conviction.[3] Thus, a judge has the discretion to increase a defendant's sentence beyond the statutory maximum based on the defendant's prior convictions.[4]

However, whether the Court specifically addressed the differences between adult convictions and juvenile adjudications, which usually occur without juries, is unclear in regard to what constitutes a conviction for Apprendi purposes.[5] In a pre-Apprendi case, United States v. Williams,[6] the Ninth Circuit held that using juvenile adjudications for sentence enhancement within the United States Sentencing Guidelines ("Guidelines”) did not violate due process.[7] However, Williams is not dispositive because it only addressed sentencing within the statutory range.[8] In Williams v. New York,[9] the Court noted that judges possess the discretion to enhance a defendant's sentence within a statutory range.[10] The Court in Apprendi found that a judge must take different considerations into account when enhancing a defendant's sentence beyond the statutory range.[11] Apprendi controls cases in which a court expands a sentence beyond the maximum statutory range.[12]

The Eighth and Ninth Circuits have issued conflicting decisions over whether juvenile adjudications count as convictions for sentencing purposes.[13] The Ninth Circuit held that the Court's explicit mention of the procedural safeguards in Apprendi means that no lesser protection will suffice; therefore, juvenile adjudications are not convictions because the adjudications are conducted without a jury.[14] Conversely, the Eighth Circuit held that the procedural safeguards mentioned in Apprendi are just examples and that other safeguards are sufficient to increase sentences beyond the statutory maximum.[15] Furthermore, the focus should be on whether the adjudication is reliable and in compliance with due process.[16] Juvenile defendants possess other procedural safeguards such as "the right to notice, the right to counsel, the right to . . . cross-examine witnesses, and the privilege against self-incrimination.”[17] Judges must also find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt before they can convict juveniles.[18] While juvenile defendants lack the same access to a trial by jury that adult defendants have, this should not undermine the reliability of juvenile adjudications because the Constitution does not require jury trials.[19]

This Comment explores the fundamental difference between juvenile adjudications and adult proceedings and determines whether the Eleventh Circuit should use juvenile adjudications as convictions to increase sentences under Apprendi beyond statutorily defined maximums. Part I provides an overview of the development of juvenile proceedings.[20] Part II examines the use of juvenile adjudications as convictions in the Guidelines.[21] Part III analyzes the Apprendi case.[22] Part IV discusses the different opinions within the circuits regarding the use of juvenile adjudications for Apprendi purposes.[23] Part V discusses recent state decisions on the use of juvenile adjudications for Apprendi purposes,[24] and Part VI examines whether the Eleventh Circuit should use juvenile adjudications as convictions.[25] This Comment concludes that juvenile adjudications should not be used to enhance a defendant's sentence beyond the statutory maximum under Apprendi.[26]

I.   Historical Context: The Evolution of Juvenile Proceedings

A.   The Progressive Movement

Progressivism included ideologies on issues ranging from economic regulation to criminal justice.[27] The theme of the Progressive movement was to solve society's problems with solutions formulated by professionals and experts.[28] The Progressives relied on the state to enact these solutions.[29] They focused on reforming the offender rather than on punishing the offense.[30] The Progressives formulated the "‘Rehabilitative Ideal' that permeated all Progressive criminal justice reforms.”[31] The Rehabilitative Ideal emphasized informal and flexible policies that a court could apply on a case-by-case basis.[32] The juvenile court emerged from the Rehabilitative Ideal.[33] "The juvenile court professionals were to make discretionary, individualized treatment decisions to achieve benevolent goals and social uplift by substituting a scientific and preventive approach for the traditional punitive philosophy of the criminal law.”[34] The professionals achieved these results by the state acting as parens patriae,[35] instead of treating the proceedings as adversarial;[36] consequently, the reformers did not apply the same procedural rights to juvenile defendants that are applied to adult criminal defendants.[37] The parens patriae doctrine drew no distinction between criminal and non-criminal youth conduct, a view that supported the Progressive position that juvenile court proceedings were civil rather than criminal in nature.[38]

B.   Supreme Court Changes to the Juvenile Court

The Court's decisions in the 1960s changed the juvenile court from a social welfare agency into a legal institution.[39] The informal method of the Progressive system had not solved the problem of juvenile delinquency.[40] Abuse and habitual offenders plagued the juvenile system.[41] The Court brought a legal structure to the juvenile court by granting juveniles due process rights.[42]

In In re Gault, the Court held that juveniles should be afforded fundamental procedural rights.[43] Gault involved a 15-year-old juvenile taken into custody for allegedly making obscene phone calls.[44] The juvenile court did not promptly notify Gault's parents of the custody or of the offense.[45] Furthermore, the complaining witness did not appear, the juvenile court did not record any portion of the proceeding, and it did not advise Gault of a right to counsel.[46] The juvenile court subsequently found Gault delinquent and sentenced him to a state industrial school for the remainder of his minority.[47]

The Supreme Court reasoned, contrary to the Progressives' ideals, that juvenile commitment was incarceration and that juveniles should be afforded certain procedural rights, regardless of whether their proceedings were labeled criminal or civil.[48] Due process is the foundation of individual freedom.[49] The Court concluded that the Constitution requires that children be afforded due process rights in proceedings against them.[50]

The Court further reasoned that due process rights are also necessary in establishing the truth where opposing facts and data exist, as is common in juvenile proceedings.[51] Thus, the implementation of procedural due process standards will enhance the juvenile process because the states will not have to give up any "substantive benefits of the juvenile process” and its rehabilitative nature.[52] The procedural safeguards afforded to juveniles through Gault are: advance notice of charges, the right to counsel, the opportunity to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and a privilege against self-incrimination.[53]

The Court further defined the rights afforded to juveniles in In re Winship[54] and in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania.[55] In Winship, the Court held that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is required to adjudge a juvenile delinquent for an act that would be considered a crime if the juvenile were an adult.[56] The Court reasoned that the reasonable doubt standard is an important concept in criminal procedure.[57] It reduces "the risk of convictions resting on factual error.”[58] The same reasons that require reasonable doubt to protect the fact finding process for innocent adults also hold true for innocent children.[59] Therefore, the Court held that the prosecution must establish proof of delinquency beyond a reasonable doubt, rather than by a civil proceeding standard such as preponderance of the evidence.[60]

The Court in McKeiver held that a jury is not required in a juvenile proceeding because the only requirement for fundamental fairness in these proceedings is accurate fact finding, a requirement that a judge or a jury can easily satisfy.[61] The Court reasoned that a jury trial would not strengthen the fact finding function and could create a conflict in the character of juvenile proceedings.[62]

Gault, Winship, and McKeiver created a procedural revolution for juvenile proceedings that transformed the initial Progressive conception.[63] "By emphasizing criminal procedural regularity in the determination of delinquency, the Supreme Court shifted the focus of the juvenile court from the Progressive emphasis on the ‘real needs' of the child to proof of the commission of criminal acts, thereby effectively transforming juvenile proceedings into criminal prosecutions.”[64]

II.   The Use of Juvenile Adjudications Under the United States Sentencing Guidelines

When a federal court convicts a defendant, the judge must use the Guidelines to impose a sentence.[65] The Guidelines do not take into consideration factors such as race and economic status.[66] Instead, judges uniformly apply mandatory sentences for offenses.[67] The defendant receives a total criminal history score "based on their present offense and prior criminal record.”[68] The judge then applies the sentence that corresponds with that classification.[69] The court is allowed to consider juvenile adjudications in calculating the criminal history score.[70] Some federal courts have addressed whether enhancing adult sentences with juvenile adjudications is constitutional because the proceedings are procedurally different.[71]

In United States v. Williams, the Ninth Circuit addressed the constitutionality of using juvenile adjudications to enhance adult sentences.[72] Williams argued that while bench trials are constitutional for juvenile proceedings, using those proceedings to enhance an adult's sentence is unconstitutional.[73] Williams relied on the Court's decision in Baldasar v. Illinois[74] to support his contention.[75] The court in Baldasar held that a judge cannot use an uncounseled conviction to enhance a sentence in a proceeding in which counsel is constitutionally required.[76]

The court in Williams found that Baldasar was not analogous because "[t]he right to counsel is more fundamental than the right to a jury trial.”[77] Furthermore, "it is not unconstitutional to deprive a juvenile of liberty without a jury trial.”[78] The court reasoned that using juvenile proceedings to enhance adult sentences is constitutionally permissible because a juvenile's due process rights are not violated when he is found to be delinquent without a jury trial.[79] The court in Williams chose to limit the Baldasar holding to prevent subsequent use of a conviction to enhance a defendant's sentence only in cases involving a right to counsel, instead of extending the holding to include any deprivation of a constitutional right.[80]

The Third Circuit in United States v. Bucaro[81] considered whether using juvenile adjudications to enhance a defendant's sentence under the Guidelines violated due process and the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws.[82] The defendant argued in Bucaro that section 4A1.2(d)(2) of the Guidelines was an ex post facto law because it considered juvenile adjudications when, at the time of those adjudications, juveniles understood that juvenile records would not be used against them in other proceedings.[83] The court rejected the defendant's ex post facto argument and found that his punishment was for the criminal acts he committed "and the guideline that took his prior conduct into account was in effect when he committed the criminal offenses for which [he was being punished].”[84]

The defendant also argued that the Guidelines violated his due process rights because they were inconsistent with Pennsylvania law.[85] He was not provided with notice that a court could use his juvenile adjudications against him in later criminal proceedings because the Pennsylvania Model Juvenile Court Act provided that a court could not use his juvenile adjudications against him.[86] However, the court found that the state juvenile statute did give notice; the Act contained an exception that would allow a court to use his adjudication for sentencing after conviction of a felony.[87] Therefore, the defendant did have notice and the court's use of his juvenile adjudications in sentencing did not violate his rights.[88]  

 

III.   Apprendi v. New Jersey

On December 22, 1994, Charles C. Apprendi, Jr. fired shots into the home of an African American family who had recently moved into his all-white neighborhood.[89] The police arrested Apprendi, who admitted he was the shooter.[90] After further questioning, he said that "because [the home owners were] black in color he [did] not want them in the neighborhood.”[91] Apprendi later retracted this statement.[92] He entered into a plea agreement in which he plead guilty to "two counts . . . of second-degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose . . . and one count of the third-degree offense of unlawful possession of an antipersonnel bomb.”[93] A New Jersey statute classified the possession of a firearm for unlawful purposes as a second-degree offense punishable with a sentence of five to ten years.[94] However, the state reserved the right to impose an enhanced sentence based on a hate crime statute if the trial judge found that Apprendi committed the acts with a biased purpose.[95] Taking into consideration Apprendi's retracted statement, the trial judge (1) found that Apprendi violated the hate crime statute and (2) enhanced his sentence.[96] Apprendi challenged the enhancement on the grounds that it violated the Constitution.[97] The question presented to the Court was "whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that a factual determination authorizing an increase in the maximum prison sentence for an offense from 10 to 20 years be made by a jury on the basis of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”[98] The Court first noted that judges have historically used discretion in enhancing sentences within a statutory range.[99] However, Apprendi's contention posed a different legal question because the statute provided the judge discretion to double the maximum statutory range.[100] The Court held that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”[101] The Court examined precedent to explain the constitutional use of prior convictions for sentence enhancement.[102]

In a pre-Apprendi case, Almendarez-Torres v. United States,[103] the Court considered whether earlier convictions were elements of the crime and thus should be charged in the indictment or if the earlier convictions were sentencing factors and not required in the indictment.[104] The Court held that "[a]n indictment . . . need not set forth factors relevant only to sentencing of an offender found guilty of the charged crime.”[105] The Court admitted the earlier convictions, which were found pursuant to proceedings with substantial procedural safeguards.[106] Thus, the Court held that the procedural safeguards attached to prior convictions, allowing the constitutional use of prior convictions by later courts in enhancing a defendant's sentence beyond the statutory maximum.[107]

Similarly, in Jones v. United States[108] the Court held that

under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any factor (other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.[109]

After reexamining the precedent, the Court in Apprendi adopted the holding in Jones, confirming the use of prior convictions for sentence enhancement beyond the statutory range.[110]

IV.   The Circuit Split

In Apprendi, the Court did not address whether juvenile adjudications should count as convictions.[111] However, the Court listed a right to a jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt as procedural safeguards that should attach to the prior conviction.[112] Because juvenile adjudications usually occur without a jury trial, circuits have struggled over whether the listed rights in Apprendi are the only adequate rights for use of a prior conviction or if they are merely examples of adequate procedural safeguards.[113] A circuit court split has developed over whether juvenile adjudications count as convictions.[114]

A.   The Ninth Circuit View: Juvenile Adjudications Should Not Be Used as Convictions for Apprendi Purposes

The Ninth Circuit held in United States v. Tighe[115] that juvenile adjudications should not enhance a defendant's sentence beyond the statutory maximum under Apprendi.[116] While the Ninth Circuit decided in Williams that using a juvenile adjudication to enhance a defendant's sentence under the Guidelines was constitutional, Williams is not dispositive of the issue in Tighe.[117] In Williams, the sentence enhancement was within the statutory range; in Tighe, the enhancement would be outside the range, resulting in a potential constitutional violation.[118] When a court enhances a defendant's sentence beyond the statutory range based on juvenile adjudications, the differences between adult convictions and juvenile adjudications become important.[119] To determine the constitutionality of using juvenile adjudications for enhancements, the Ninth Circuit analyzed the scope of the term "conviction” as used in Apprendi and in cases leading up to Apprendi.[120]

In Almendarez-Torres the Court held that a prior conviction was "a sentencing factor, and not a separate element of the crime to be charged in the indictment.”[121] In Jones, the Court further explained that prior convictions can enhance a defendant's sentence if they had been "established through procedures satisfying the fair notice, reasonable doubt and jury trial guarantees.”[122] Relying on precedent, the Court in Apprendi stated that prior convictions could be used to enhance sentences beyond the statutory maximum because of the "certainty that procedural safeguards attached” to that prior conviction.[123]

While in Apprendi the Court relied on the Almendarez-Torres holding for use of a prior conviction as a sentencing factor, the Court noted that the exception to the general rule should be narrow.[124] The Court in Apprendi also specifically identified a jury trial as one of the required procedural safeguards.[125] Therefore, the Ninth Circuit ruled that convictions under Apprendi must be limited to those in which the defendant had a right to a jury trial.[126]  

B.   The Eighth Circuit View: Juvenile Adjudications Should Be Used as Convictions for Apprendi Purposes

The Eighth Circuit in United States v. Smalley[127] held that juvenile adjudications can be used as prior convictions under Apprendi.[128] The court reasoned that a conviction affording the "fundamental triumvirate of procedural protections” is not the only type of conviction that can qualify for an Apprendi exception.[129] To support this reasoning, the Eighth Circuit relied on the fact that the Court in Apprendi did not quote the specific language in Jones that referred to the fundamental triumvirate as being necessary to use a prior conviction.[130] The Court in Apprendi only referred to a right to a jury trial and proof beyond reasonable doubt in explaining the exception for prior convictions.[131] Therefore, the procedural safeguards listed in Jones and Apprendi were sufficient to allow the use of prior convictions, but other procedural safeguards can also be constitutionally sufficient.[132]    

Disagreeing with the Ninth Circuit, the Eighth Circuit determined that whether juvenile adjudications count as convictions "should not turn on the narrow parsing of words, but on an examination of whether juvenile adjudications, like adult convictions, are so reliable that due process of law is not offended by such an exemption.”[133] The Eighth Circuit found that juvenile adjudications are reliable.[134] A juvenile cannot be convicted without proof beyond a reasonable doubt.[135] A juvenile also has "the right to notice, the right to counsel, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and the privilege against self-incrimination.”[136] Moreover, a jury trial is not necessary to add to the reliability of a juvenile adjudication.[137] Therefore, the "safeguards [afforded to juveniles] are more than sufficient to ensure the reliability that Apprendi requires.”[138]

V.   State Decisions on Juvenile Adjudications and Apprendi

The Supreme Court of Kansas in State v. Hitt[139] agreed with the Eighth Circuit in holding that juvenile adjudications qualify for the conviction exception under Apprendi.[140] In addition to focusing on the role of recidivism in sentencing, the court noted that Apprendi did not specifically list all the necessary procedures required to meet the conviction exception.[141] Therefore, the court held that the procedural safeguards attached to juvenile proceedings were sufficient to qualify as a conviction under Apprendi.[142]

In People v. Bowden,[143] the Court of Appeal for the Second District of California disagreed with the Ninth Circuit in Tighe, even though the court held that Tighe and Apprendi were not relevant to Bowden.[144] The California court reasoned that a judge can consider prior convictions when sentencing because of the procedural safeguards the court previously attached to the convictions.[145] In adult criminal trials, this includes the right to a jury trial and in juvenile adjudications the procedural rights afforded to juvenile defendants.[146]  

VI.   Should the Eleventh Circuit Use Juvenile Adjudications as Convictions for Apprendi Purposes?

The Eleventh Circuit should not use juvenile adjudications as convictions for Apprendi purposes.[147] When the Court changed the juvenile system by adding procedural safeguards, it did so because the procedures would enhance the system.[148] The Court wanted to keep intact some of the fundamental principles of the juvenile system.[149] One of the main fundamental principles the Court wanted to preserve was the rehabilitative nature of the juvenile process.[150] The Court did not want juveniles to suffer as adults for the delinquency of their youth.[151] Therefore, the Court kept certain distinctions in place between the rehabilitative nature of juvenile adjudications and the punitive nature of criminal proceedings.[152] Given the rehabilitative nature of the juvenile process, the Eleventh Circuit should not count juvenile adjudications against adult criminal defendants.[153] Using the adjudications as convictions poses problems for juveniles and for adults.[154]

Juvenile courts may hesitate to prescribe therapeutic incarceration for juveniles for fear that a court may use the adjudication against the juvenile as an adult, thereby releasing some juveniles who need the court's help back into society.[155] Therapeutic sentences are necessary to the rehabilitative theme of juvenile justice as an effort to help reform juveniles.[156] When courts use adjudications as convictions, the juvenile system loses its distinction from criminal proceedings.[157] The adult also suffers because his sentence is enhanced by a proceeding in which he was not afforded all of his constitutional rights.[158]

The Court did not guarantee juveniles the right to a jury trial because the Court reasoned that it would not add anything to the juvenile process, although it would simultaneously disrupt some of the process' fundamental principles.[159] When the Court in McKeiver decided that juveniles did not possess a right to jury trials, it did so with the assumption that the juvenile system was a rehabilitative process and that courts would not use juvenile proceedings against the juvenile when he becomes an adult.[160] Furthermore, if a court convicted an adult without a jury trial, the court could not use that conviction to enhance a later sentence.[161] Adults with juvenile convictions should receive the same procedural protection.[162]

The Eleventh Circuit should adopt the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit in Tighe and deny the use of juvenile adjudications as prior convictions.[163] The Supreme Court in Apprendi relied on Jones, which stated that a court must attach fair notice, reasonable doubt, and jury trial guarantees to a prior conviction before using it to enhance a defendant's sentence.[164] To strengthen the adoption of the holding in Jones, the Court in Apprendi reiterated that a jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt are necessary procedural safeguards for facts supporting sentence enhancements.[165]

Contrary to the Ninth Circuit, the Eighth Circuit reasoned that because the Court in Apprendi did not list all three safeguards cited in Jones, the two safeguards listed are mere examples, and other safeguards are constitutionally adequate.[166] However, the Eighth Circuit's reasoning is not convincing.[167] Because the Court explicitly listed a jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt, these two safeguards are absolutely necessary and are even more important than notice.[168] The Court further supported the contention that a jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt are necessary by holding that using other facts for sentence enhancement without these safeguards would be unconstitutional.[169]

The Court in Apprendi also relied on Almendarez-Torres, which held that prior convictions are sentencing factors and not separate elements of a crime.[170] The Court cautioned that the exception of a prior conviction for sentence enhancement should be narrowly construed.[171] Because the Court found that the exception should be narrowly construed and specifically listed a jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt as required procedural safeguards, prior convictions for Apprendi purposes should be limited to those in which a defendant had a right to a jury trial and was found guilty by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.[172]

The state court reasons for allowing juvenile adjudications to count as convictions under Apprendi are also unpersuasive.[173] The Court of Appeal for the Second District of California reasoned that a judge can treat a juvenile adjudication as a prior conviction so long as the adjudication included all of the constitutional rights afforded to juveniles.[174] The Court agreed with the Eighth Circuit in finding that the safeguards constitutionally afforded to juveniles are more than sufficient "to ensure the reliability that Apprendi requires.”[175] However, the Court of Appeal for the Second District of California noted that Apprendi and Tighe were not relevant to its case.[176] Under California law, the prior conviction must be "proved . . . beyond a reasonable doubt . . . and the defendant has a statutory right to a jury trial, at least on the issue whether the defendant suffered a prior conviction.”[177] The California court's agreement with the Eighth Circuit seems contrary to California law.[178] California law gives a defendant the right to a jury trial, which is the procedural safeguard at issue when determining whether juvenile adjudications should count as convictions.[179] Yet, the Court of Appeal for the Second District of California still follows the Eighth Circuit's reasoning.[180]

The Eleventh Circuit should not be swayed by the use of juvenile adjudications as prior convictions in the Guidelines.[181] Sentences imposed by the Guidelines are within a statutory range and therefore do not address the issue presented in Apprendi, which enhances a defendant's sentence outside of the statutory range.[182] While the Ninth Circuit in Williams held that use of juvenile adjudications as convictions was constitutional, Williams can be distinguished from Apprendi.[183] The defendant in Williams relied on Baldasar, which held that a court could not use an uncounseled conviction to enhance a sentence in a proceeding in which counsel is constitutionally required.[184] The court in Williams held that the right to counsel is more fundamental than the right to a jury trial, and thus juvenile adjudications can count as convictions under the Guidelines.[185] However, the Court in Apprendi placed great importance on the procedural safeguard of jury trials determining facts to be used for sentence enhancement outside the statutory range.[186] Therefore, the right to a jury trial becomes important when a judge wants to enhance a defendant's sentence beyond the statutory range.[187]

The Third Circuit in Bucaro held that using juvenile adjudications to enhance a defendant's sentence under the Guidelines did not violate the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws.[188] The court limited this holding because the state statute at issue notified the juvenile that his adjudication might affect his sentencing as an adult.[189] However, each state has its own juvenile system, and thus each statute might not account for use of juvenile adjudications as adults.[190] Therefore, an ex post facto violation may exist depending on which state juvenile statute is in issue.[191]

Conclusion

The juvenile system is fundamentally different from the criminal justice system.[192] Juveniles are not afforded the same rights as adults in criminal proceedings because juvenile adjudications have a rehabilitative purpose and criminal proceedings have a punitive purpose.[193] Another important difference is the lack of jury trials in juvenile proceedings.[194] While denying juveniles the right to a jury trial is constitutionally permissible, it poses a constitutional problem when juvenile adjudications are then used to enhance adult sentences beyond the statutory maximum.[195] While some courts read Apprendi as allowing juvenile adjudications to count as convictions, that reasoning is flawed because the Court specifically listed a jury trial as one of the procedural safeguards needed to use facts to extend a sentence.[196] Courts cannot rely on the previous use of juvenile adjudications for convictions in the Guidelines because that calls for enhancement within a statutory range.[197] Thus, courts should follow the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit and forbid the use of juvenile adjudications as convictions for Apprendi purposes.[198]

Kimberly L. Johnson

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